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Democracy and Dissent:
Reconsidering the Judicial Review
of the Political Sphere
Yasmin Dawood*

Although there exists a lively debate as to whether dissenting opinions at the Supreme Court serve to enhance democratic legitimacy or
undermine it, the specific issue of “dissenting about democracy” has received little attention. This article therefore focuses on the role of
dissenting opinions when the topic before the Court is the democratic
system itself. In its law of democracy decisions,1 the Court has addressed

*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Benjamin
Berger, Jamie Cameron, Sonia Lawrence, Carissima Mathen, and anonymous reviewers for very
helpful comments and conversations. My thanks as well to Sarah McLeod and Tamar Meshel for
excellent research assistance.
1
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Reference”] (electoral boundary drawing); Sauvé v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 59, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé I”]
(inmate voting rights); Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2
S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”] (residency requirements during referenda); Harvey v.
New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 82, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Harvey”] (membership in provincial legislatures); Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997]
S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Libman”] (referendum spending limits);
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”] (public opinion polls); Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé II”] (inmate voting
rights); Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Figueroa”] (benefits for political parties); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”] (third party election
spending); R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”]
(distribution of election results); Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Opitz”] (contested elections and the entitlement to vote).
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various aspects of the democratic system, including electoral redistricting, campaign finance, referenda and opinion polls.2
It is striking that the Court’s law of democracy cases have a much
higher rate of dissent (approximately 65 per cent) as compared to the
average rate (approximately 35 per cent).3 Consider, for instance, the
Court’s recent decision in Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, a case which concerned
a contested election in the Etobicoke Centre Riding.4 The Court was
sharply divided. In a 4-3 decision, the majority and dissenting opinions
laid forth divergent approaches as to how courts should determine the
entitlement to vote.5 The Opitz decision is yet another law of democracy
case in which there is considerable disagreement among the justices.
This article examines the phenomenon of “dissenting about democracy”, and in particular, it seeks to understand why there is so little
consensus on the Supreme Court with respect to its law of democracy
cases. My central claim is that the high rate of dissent is driven in part by
a fundamental disagreement about the nature of democracy itself. While
the Court’s law of democracy cases are concerned with differing legal
issues, there is an underlying problem that unites them. Specifically,
I argue that these cases present the following conceptual puzzle: is the
electoral system best conceived as a constitutional entity or a political
entity? On the one hand, the democratic process is a product of a wide
array of constitutional provisions, rights and rules. On the other hand, the
democratic process is the quintessential site of politics.
I refer to this puzzle as the “framework/politics” problem. The puzzle underlying many cases is whether the electoral process is better seen
as belonging to the overarching constitutional framework, or whether it
is better viewed as belonging to the political activity that takes place
within this framework. I argue that the framework/politics problem lies at
the heart of the divide between the majority and the dissenting justices in
many of the Court’s law of democracy cases. These cases often turn on

2
The Court’s law of democracy cases have arisen under s. 3 (the right to vote), s. 2(b) and
2(d) (freedoms of expression and association), and s. 15 (equality guarantee) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Colin Feasby, “Constitutional
Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 514, at 539
(defining the law of the political process as encompassing decisions that fall under ss. 3, 2 and 15).
3
See Part II.1.
4
Opitz, supra, note 1.
5
See discussion of Opitz in Part II.2.
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divergent approaches to the issue of judicial deference.6 Those justices
who characterize the electoral process as “political” tend to defer to the
legislature with respect to electoral laws. By contrast, those justices that
conceive of the electoral system as part of the constitutional framework
tend to subject the electoral law to greater scrutiny. Thus, the divide on
the Court is often rooted in a fundamental disagreement about the proper
characterization of the electoral process.
This article examines the framework/politics problem, and shows
how it arises in a wide array of the Court’s law of democracy cases. Even
though these cases are concerned with different legal issues, they are
united by the fundamental question of whether the Court should treat the
electoral process as primarily belonging to the political sphere or the
constitutional framework. In recent cases, a majority of the Court has
tended to treat the electoral process as “political”, and for this reason, it
has deferred to the legislature when evaluating the constitutionality of
electoral laws. I argue, however, that the electoral process is better conceived of as a dual constitutional-political entity. The main implication of
this observation is that the Court should not automatically defer to the
legislature on the grounds that the electoral process is political. I claim
that the Court’s role is to protect the fairness and legitimacy of the democratic process,7 and this means that it must subject the political
aspects of the electoral process to constitutional limits. Instead of deferring to the legislature on the basis that the electoral system is political,
the Court should subject electoral laws to greater scrutiny to ensure that
these laws do not undermine constitutionally protected rights.
This article proceeds in three sections. Part I examines two main approaches to dissenting opinions and democracy: the legitimacy-detracting
view and the legitimacy-enhancing view, respectively. Part I also provides a
comparative analysis of the rates of dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada
and the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively. Part II begins with a quantitative
analysis of the rate of dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
law of democracy cases. It then engages in a discussion of the Court’s most

6

Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social Science Evidence in
Election Law Cases” (forthcoming Nat. J. Const. L. 2013) [hereinafter “Dawood, ‘Democracy and
Deference’”].
7
Yasmin Dawood, “Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights
Approach to Judicial Review” (2012) 62 U.T.L.J. 499, at 504-505 [hereinafter “Dawood, ‘Electoral
Fairness’”].
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recent election law case, Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj. Part III turns to a consideration of the “framework/politics” puzzle, and shows how it manifests in
various decisions. In addition, it considers how the Court should address the
duality of the electoral system. This Part argues that the Court’s role is to
secure the fairness and legitimacy of the democratic process, and for this
reason the Court must ensure that the political aspects of the electoral system
are subject to constitutional limits.

I. DISSENTING OPINIONS: THEORY AND TRENDS
There are two main conceptual approaches to the role and function of
dissenting opinions, which can be labelled the legitimacy-detracting view
and the legitimacy-enhancing view, respectively. Some people argue that
dissents detract from the legitimacy and authority of law. Chief Justice
Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, views dissents as a
“symptom of dysfunction” that weakens the authority of the court because internal divisions are revealed.8 The legitimacy-detracting view
can be further subdivided into the institutional approach and the interpretive approach.9 The institutional approach is based on the idea that
institutions must speak with a single voice in order to uphold the rule of
law.10 That is, the Court’s public statements should not be the statements
of individual justices. Dissenting opinions disrupt the institutional approach because the opinions are attached to specific justices rather than
to the Court as a public institution. The interpretive approach is based
upon a conception of objectivity and compliance with the rule of law.11
That is, the law produces determinate and objective outcomes. Dissenting opinions disrupt the interpretive approach because they suggest that
there is no one legal resolution to a given problem.
According to the legitimacy-enhancing view, dissenting opinions play
a crucial role in protecting and furthering rule of law values. Justice
Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court argues, for instance, that “the right to
dissent is one of the great and cherished freedoms” in a democratic

8

Todd M. Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent” (2007) 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 283, at 283 [hereinafter “Henderson”].
9
Kevin M. Stack, “The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court” (1995) 105 Yale L.J.
2235, at 2237 [hereinafter “Stack”].
10
Id.
11
Id.
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system.12 One purpose of dissents is to point out the flaws in the majority’s
reasoning. Dissents are thus “offered as a corrective in the hope that the
Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case”.13 In a similar vein,
Ginsburg J. observes that dissents serve to strengthen the majority opinion
because the majority justices have to respond to the concerns of the
dissenting justices.14 Judge Diane Wood likewise argues that dissents hold
the majority accountable.15 Another advantage to dissents is that they
provide practical guidance to future litigants about how to distinguish
subsequent cases.16 Dissents also add to the marketplace of ideas.17
Some commentators argue that dissents enhance democratic legitimacy because they are an instance of reasoned discourse.18 Kevin Stack
contends, for example, that dissents can be justified under the theory of
deliberative democracy.19 He argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s political legitimacy “depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments
through a deliberative process”.20 While a unanimous opinion provides
reasons, the presence of a dissenting opinion demonstrates reasoned dialogue or the exchange of reasons.21 The practice of dissent promotes
deliberation and is thus in keeping with democratic principles.22
There are well-known dissents that have shaped the evolution of the
law and made it better over time.23 Dissents are at times vindicated when
the Supreme Court changes its course, when the Constitution is amended,

12
William J. Brennan, Jr., “In Defense of Dissents” (1985) 37 Hastings L.J. 427, at 438
[hereinafter “Brennan”].
13
Id., at 430.
14
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Remarks on Writing Separately” (1990) 65 Wash. L. Rev. 133,
at 139.
15
Diane P. Wood, “When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decision
Making on a Multi-Member Court” (2012) 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1445, at 1445 [hereinafter “Wood”].
16
Brennan, supra, note 12, at 430.
17
Id., at 435.
18
Note, “From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent (2011) 124
Harv. L. Rev. 1305, at 1315-16; Peter Bozzo, Shimmy Edwards & April A. Christine, “Many Voices, One
Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court” (2011) 36 J .Sup. Ct. Hist. 193, at 194.
19
Stack, supra, note 9, at 2236.
20
Id.
21
Id., at 2257.
22
Id., at 2246.
23
Henderson, supra, note 8, at 329, 335. The examples of law-changing dissents that are
routinely referred to in the United States include Justice Curtis’ dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393 (1857), Harlan J.’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 532 (1896), and Holmes J.’s dissents in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 95 (1905) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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or when legislation is enacted.24 It should be noted, however, that there
are different approaches to opinion writing in different jurisdictions. At
one end of the spectrum is the practice in England where opinions are
issued in seriatim.25 Courts in civil law countries, which issue only one
decision, are at the other end of the spectrum.26 Courts in Canada and the
United States tend to take a middle path between issuing a single opinion
and issuing seriatim opinions.27 Yet even within this middle path, some
chief justices are known for discouraging dissents. At the beginning of
her tenure, McLachlin C.J.C. stated that one of her main objectives was
to increase consensus on the Court.28 Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court was known for insisting on one opinion for the Court.29
With respect to patterns of dissent at the U.S. Supreme Court, there are
dissenting opinions in more than half of the cases between 1941 and 1997.30
Another study finds that the U.S. Supreme Court rendered unanimous judgments in about 40 per cent of its cases between 1990 and 2000.31 For the
same period, the Supreme Court of Canada displayed a greater norm of consensus with about 60 per cent of cases leading to unanimous decisions.32
Another study found that the Supreme Court of Canada obtained unanimity
in over 63 per cent of its cases from 1975 to 2005 in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court which contained a unanimity rate of 28.4 per cent.33
Chief Justice McLachlin’s unanimity rate from 2000 to 2009 was
approximately 63 per cent (as compared to 58.4 per cent under Lamer
C.J.C. from 1990-2000 and 64.7 per cent under Dickson C.J.C. from 19841990).34 The increase in unanimity under McLachlin C.J.C. is greater than
the raw statistics would suggest because she has a far higher rate of
assigning panels of nine than her predecessors. Chief Justice McLachlin

24

Wood, supra, note 15, at 1458.
Id., at 1449.
26
Id., at 1448.
27
Id., at 1450.
28
Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010)
52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379, at 384 [hereinafter “Macfarlane”].
29
Wood, supra, note 15, at 1450.
30
Henderson, supra, note 8, at 333.
31
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus
and Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 475, at 476, 486 [hereinafter
“Alarie & Green”].
32
Id., at 476, 486.
33
Macfarlane, supra, note 28, at 380.
34
Id., at 385.
25
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assigned panels of nine in 52 per cent of cases, Lamer C.J.C. in 30 per cent,
and Dickson C.J.C. in 10 per cent.35 Chief Justice McLachlin has also tried
to consolidate disagreement so that there are fewer concurrences.36
In the post-Charter period, the Supreme Court of Canada has been
relatively cooperative.37 The reasons for this difference between the
United States and Canada could be the fact that the appointments process
is less partisan and politicized.38 Another possible reason is that legal
culture is more deferential to the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.39
In addition, Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green have found that the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada are not as overtly ideological in
their voting patterns as the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.40

II. DISSENTING ABOUT DEMOCRACY
1. Dissents and the Law of Democracy
It is striking to observe that despite the general trend toward consensus at the Supreme Court, the law of democracy cases involve a great
deal of dissenting. Although the sample size is too small to draw any firm
conclusions, it is worth tabulating the rate of dissent (please see Table 1
below for the breakdown).

35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Alarie & Green, supra, note 31, at 486.
Macfarlane, supra, note 28, at 380.
Id.
Alarie & Green, supra, note 31, at 475.

Saskatchewan
Reference
Sauvé I
Haig
Harvey
Libman
Thompson
Newspapers
Sauvé II
Figueroa
Harper
Bryan
Opitz

Case

X

X
X

X

X

Unanimous
in Reasons

X

Unanimous
in Result

9
5
6
9
5
5
6
6
1+1+3
4

5-4
9-0
6-3
5-4
4-3

Majority
Opinion
5

9-0
7-2
9-0
9-0
5-3

Holding
Breakdown
6-3

Table 1: Law of Democracy Cases

0
3
0
0
0

0

0
1+1+2
1+2

1

Concurrences

4
0
3
4
3

3

0
2
0

Dissenting
Opinion
3
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Out of 11 total cases, only four (or 36 per cent) are unanimous with
respect to the result and only two (or 18 per cent) are unanimous with
respect to the reasoning. Seven cases (or 64 per cent) have dissenting
opinions, while the remaining four (or 36 per cent) are composed of
majority and concurring opinions. Of the four cases that do not have any
dissents, one case (Sauvé I) consists of a brief paragraph, one case
(Harvey) has two concurring opinions, and one case (Figueroa) has one
concurring opinion. Thus, there is only one case out of 11 (Libman) in
which the Court has issued a fully reasoned decision to which all nine
justices have given their assent. The rates of concurrence are also worth
noting: five out of 11 (or 45 per cent) of the Court’s law of democracy
cases have concurring opinions. The status of concurring opinions is
somewhat ambiguous because at times concurring opinions closely track
the reasoning of the majority but at other times they depart significantly
from the majority’s reasoning. Even if we leave aside the concurring
opinions, these data show a great deal of dissenting about democracy. It
is notable that there is a significant amount of dissent even though there
have been changes to the membership of the Court since 1991.
2. The Opitz Case
The trend of dissenting about democracy was also evident in the Supreme Court’s most recent law of democracy decision. The Opitz case
concerned the entitlement to vote and how this entitlement is determined.
The case arose out of a contested election result in the May 2011 federal
election.41 In the Etobicoke Centre riding 52,794 votes were cast. Conservative MP Ted Opitz won the riding by a narrow 26 votes against
Liberal incumbent Boris Wrzesnewskyj. The case concerned the entitlement to vote and how this entitlement is determined. In May 2012,
Ontario Superior Court Justice Thomas Lederer set aside Opitz’s win on
the basis that 79 ballots had procedural irregularities.42 There was no evidence of fraud or corruption.
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court, thus
averting a new election. The Court held that 59 of the 79 votes set aside
41
For a discussion of the issues, see Andrew Geddis, “Resolving Disputed Elections in
Canada and New Zealand”, paper presented at the 2012 Constitutional Roundtable, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto (unpublished manuscript).
42
[2012] O.J. No. 2308, 110 O.R. (3d) 350 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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by the Ontario Superior Court should be reinstated. Mr. Opitz won with a
six-vote margin. In a majority decision by Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.
(joined by Deschamps and Abella JJ.), the Court refused to “disqualify
the votes of several Canadian citizens based on administrative mistakes,
notwithstanding evidence that those citizens were in fact entitled to
vote”.43 The majority stated that disenfranchising entitled voters would
undermine public confidence in the electoral process.44 The Court was
also concerned that if annulments of elections were easy to do, the “finality and legitimacy of election results will be eroded”.45 For this reason,
“[o]nly irregularities that affect the result of the election and thereby undermine the integrity of the electoral process are grounds for overturning
an election”.46
The case involved section 3 of the Charter, which protects the right to
vote, and section 6 of the Canada Elections Act47 which sets out requirements for how citizens are to satisfy election officials that they are entitled
to vote. Section 524(1) of the Canada Elections Act provides that elections
can be contested on the grounds that there were “irregularities, fraud or
corrupt or illegal practices that affected the result of the election”. Section
531(2) provides that if these grounds are established a court may annul the
election.48 The Court majority also outlined the administrative procedures
by which entitlement to vote has to be ascertained.49 According to the majority, the procedural safeguards while important, should not be treated as
“ends in themselves”; such procedures are only a means for ensuring that
those who are entitled to vote do so.50 Ambiguities in statutory language
should be “interpreted in a way that is enfranchising”.51 At the same time,
the procedures in the Act are necessary to safeguard the public’s faith that
elections are fair.52 The Court majority acknowledged that the electoral
system “must balance several interrelated and sometimes conflicting
values ... include[ing] certainty, accuracy, fairness, accessibility, voter

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Opitz, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
Id.
Id., at para. 2.
Id.
S.C. 2000, c. 9.
Opitz, supra, note 1, at para. 20.
Id., at paras. 13-18.
Id., at para. 43.
Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 38
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anonymity, promptness, finality, legitimacy, efficiency and cost” and most
importantly of all — the right to vote.53
There are two approaches, developed by the lower courts, for determining the validity of an election. The first is a strict procedural approach
under which a vote is deemed to be invalid in the event an election official
fails to follow any one of the procedures used to establish the entitlement
to vote.54 The second is a substantive approach, under which the failure to
abide by a single requirement is not fatal. The substantive approach invalidates only those votes that were cast by citizens not entitled to vote.55
The majority adopted the substantive approach because “it focuses
on the underlying right to vote, not merely on the procedures used to facilitate and protect that right”.56 There are two steps under this approach.
First, the appellant must establish an irregularity, which is defined as a
breach of a statutory provision. Second, an appellant must establish that
someone not entitled to vote actually voted. That is, the irregularity must
be shown to have “affected the result”. According to the majority, it is
permissible to rely on after-the-fact evidence of entitlement to vote.57 If
both these requirements have been satisfied, the court then applies the
“magic number” test. Under the magic number test, the election is annulled if the number of invalid votes is equal to or greater than the
number of votes by which the successful candidate won.58
Having established these standards, the majority went through the
contested ballots in great detail and found that 59 of the 79 votes should
be restored.59 Because the remaining 20 votes were less than Mr. Opitz’s
plurality of 26 votes, the Court upheld the election. The Court did not
defer to the findings of the application judge on the basis that he had
made two errors of law.60 Without delving into all the details of each contested ballot, it is worth noting that some of the mistakes made by
election officials did not, according to the majority, arise to the level of
53

Id., at para. 44.
Id., at para. 54.
55
Id., at para. 55.
56
Id., at para. 57.
57
Id., at para. 61.
58
Id., at para. 73.
59
Id., at para. 78.
60
Id., at paras. 80-81. According to the majority, the application judge reversed the onus of
proof with respect to two polls, and failed to consider material evidence with respect to two other
polls. Id. The dissenting justices disagreed with this assessment, finding that the application judge
did in fact place the onus on the right party. Id., at para. 174.
54
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an “irregularity”.61 The majority appeared to draw a distinction between
“irregularities”, which are “serious administrative errors that are capable
of undermining the electoral process” and mere mistakes.62 For instance,
the majority stated that “incorrect record-keeping of vouching, on its
own, cannot amount to an “irregularity”.63
The dissenting opinion was authored by McLachlin C.J.C. (joined by
LeBel and Fish JJ.). The dissent agreed with the majority that the “overarching purpose of the Act is to ensure the democratic legitimacy of
federal elections in Canada”.64 The dissent identified the principle of entitlement to vote as the “central pillar” of the electoral system. The
formal entitlement process is the mechanism by which the electoral system strikes a balance between two goals: “enabling those who have the
constitutional right to vote to do so, and ensuring that those who do not
have that right are not allowed to vote”.65
It is worth noting, however, that the dissenting justices had a different
understanding of the interaction between the Charter-protected right to vote in
section 3 and the provisions of the Canada Elections Act. According to the
dissent, the Act sets out a comprehensive scheme composed of three requirements: (1) qualification by citizenship and age — as set forth in section 3 of
the Charter; (2) registration — established by the list electors or by filing a
registration certificate; and (3) identification — established by identification
or by taking an oath and being vouched for by another elector.66
According to the dissent, “qualification” to vote is necessary but not sufficient for “entitlement” to vote.67 A voter must also satisfy the registration
and identification requirements to be entitled to vote because these requirements are crucial for protecting the integrity of the electoral system.68 Chief
Justice McLachlin argued that the justices in the majority wrongly
“merge[d] the concepts of qualification and entitlement” because they held
that “everyone who is qualified to vote and ordinarily resident in the electoral district in entitled to vote”.69 It would appear, then, that the majority

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id., at paras. 90, 93, 100, 107.
Id., at para. 24.
Id., at para. 108.
Id., at para. 145.
Id., at para. 151.
Id., at para. 139.
Id., at para. 140.
Id.
Id., at para. 164.
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gave priority to the Charter-protected right to vote, while the statutory provisions of the Canada Elections Act were viewed as only providing the means
for ascertaining the Charter right. By contrast, the dissenting justices viewed
the Charter right on par with the statutory provisions, treating all the requirements (qualification, registration and identification) as being equally
necessary to establish the entitlement to vote.
The dissent also said that the Court should not disturb the findings of
the application judge unless there was “palpable and overriding error”.
Although the judge erred with respect to some votes, there were still 65
ballots cast by persons who were not entitled to vote.70 For this reason,
the dissenting justices concluded that the election should be annulled. In
addition, the dissent rejected the view that a voter can establish entitlement later.71 Allowing voters to establish entitlement post hoc would
mean that the accuracy of the election outcome can only be confirmed by
investigating the voters’ qualifications after the election. Such a process
would be unfair to those voters who were turned away from the polls
because they had not followed the necessary steps.72
The Opitz decision will provide guidance to future courts about how
deeply to involve themselves in election disputes. A majority of four justices held that courts should not overturn elections without evidence of
serious errors that have affected the election outcome. Mere administrative mistakes are not sufficient. Allowing the election to be annulled may
have sparked further litigation in the future. Both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that the public’s confidence in the electoral
process is the central value at stake in the case. For the majority, an annulment would have shaken Canadians’ confidence in the electoral
process, while for the dissent, an annulment would have strengthened the
public’s confidence in the electoral process because it would signal that
elections would not stand in the face of irregularities.

III. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: CONSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL?
The Opitz decision is the latest in a line of Supreme Court decisions
in which there is a notable lack of consensus about the judicial review of
the democratic process. In the Court’s law of democracy decisions, the
70
71
72

Id., at para. 142.
Id., at para. 166. The Act does not provide for this possibility. Id., at para. 213.
Id., at para. 167.
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divide between the majority and dissenting justices often turns on divergent approaches to the issue of judicial deference.73 Those justices who
defer to the legislature tend to hold that the legislative provision at issue
is justified under section 1, while those justices who do not defer to the
legislature tend to find that the provision is not justified under section 1.
In this section, I argue that the debate over deference is rooted in a
deeper issue, namely, the proper characterization of the electoral system.
Is the electoral system best conceived of as a part of the constitutional
framework or as part of the political sphere? The following discussion in
the Secession Reference decision is helpful for understanding the puzzle
raised by the electoral system:
The role of the Court in this Reference is limited to the identification of the
relevant aspects of the Constitution in their broadest sense. We have
interpreted the questions as relating to the constitutional framework within
which political decisions may ultimately be made. Within that framework,
the workings of the political process are complex and can only be resolved
by means of political judgments and evaluations. The Court has no
supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional negotiations.74

The Court states that it has the authority to interpret issues relating to the
“constitutional framework within which political decisions may ultimately be made”.75 The “workings of the political process” that take
place within this framework, however, must be resolved through political
judgments, not judicial ones.76
I claim that the Court’s approach in the Secession Reference as described above sheds useful light on the issue at stake in the law of
democracy cases. In particular, I argue that the electoral system is best
conceived as comprising both constitutional aspects and political aspects.77 On the one hand, the Constitution creates the governmental
73
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structures that form the democratic system. Charter provisions protect
democratic rights such as the right to vote and the right to freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the democratic process is the site of politics. Many aspects of the democratic system are determined through the
legislative process. For example, Parliament sets out the rules for elections in the Canada Elections Act.
Some conflicts arise on the Court because there are divergent understandings as to whether the particular issue before the Court falls under the
“constitutional framework” part of the electoral system or the “politics” part
of the electoral system.78 In most cases, there is a direct conflict between the
constitutional and political aspects of the democratic process. In general, I
argue that the Court should recognize the dual political-constitutional character of the democratic process. The direct implication is that the Court
should not reflexively defer to the legislature on the basis that the electoral
process is political and hence not a subject for judicial intervention. The next
section examines some of the Court’s cases in more detail to illustrate the
challenges presented by the “framework/politics” problem.
1. Competing Views of the Court’s Role in the Political Thicket:
Saskatchewan Reference
The framework/politics problem was evident in the Supreme Court’s
first law of democracy decision. In Saskatchewan Reference, the Court considered whether Saskatchewan’s electoral boundaries violated the right to
vote as protected by section 3 of the Charter.79 The case arose because the
governing Progressive Conservative party passed the Electoral Boundaries
Commission Act (“EBCA”), which imposed various restrictions on the independent boundary commission that was charged with redrawing
Saskatchewan’s electoral map.80 The EBCA required that the urban and rural
ridings had to adhere to a strict quota, and that the urban ridings had to coincide with municipal boundaries. In addition to imposing these two
conditions, the legislation also allowed variances in the population sizes of

[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C). For a discussion of the Patriation Reference, see Peter H. Russell,
“The Patriation and Quebec Veto References: The Supreme Court Wrestles with the Political Part of
the Constitution” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 69. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
78
See the discussion of the Harvey, supra, note 1, case in Part III.2.
79
Saskatchewan Reference, supra, note 1.
80
Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, S.S. 1986-87-88, c. E-6.1.

74

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the electoral districts that were within plus or minus 25 per cent from the
provincial quotient.81 As a result of these restrictions, the electoral map favoured rural voters and under-represented urban voters.82
In a 5-3 decision, McLachlin J. (as she was then, joined by La Forest,
Gonthier, Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ.) held on behalf of the majority
that the electoral boundaries did not infringe the Charter.83 The majority
rejected the idea that electoral districts must adhere to the one-person, onevote principle. In a key passage, McLachlin J. stated that “the purpose of
the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting
power per se, but the right to “effective representation”.84 The majority also
concluded that the disparity between the rural and urban areas did not violate the right to vote.85
For the majority, electoral redistricting fell on the “politics” side of the
framework/politics divide. The majority issued very broad parameters for
electoral redistricting, thereby providing legislatures and redistricting commissions with a great deal of flexibility. In a concurring opinion, Sopinka J.
also followed the “politics” approach by arguing that the legislature is free to
impose additional rules on the commission because the commission itself
was created by the legislature.86 The majority also refused to enquire into
either the process used by the legislature or its motivations. As commentators have observed, however, the electoral boundaries at issue in
Saskatchewan Reference involved partisan rule-making.87 The redistricting
map enhanced the Progressive Conservatives’ electoral support, which in the

81
Saskatchewan Reference, supra, note 1, at 167. The provincial quotient is calculated by
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late 1980s was located primarily in the rural districts.88 The Court majority
refused to focus attention on the motivation of the political party in power.89
As discussed in more detail in Part III.5 below, the difficulty with the majority’s “politics” approach, is that it does not provide sufficient protection
against partisan rule-making by elected officials.
By contrast, the dissenting opinion viewed electoral redistricting as
raising issues that fell within the “constitutional framework” side of the
divide. Justice Cory (joined by Lamer C.J.C., and L’Heureux-Dubé J.)
concluded that there had been an infringement of section 3, and furthermore that the government had failed to justify the infringements under
section 1. Justice Cory was concerned that the legislature was interfering
with the work of the independent commission, and that the right to vote
of the urban voters was diluted as a consequence. He alluded to the problem of partisan gerrymandering, noting that the “haunting spectre of ‘rotten
boroughs’ is not that far removed as to be forgotten”.90 In addition, Cory J.
noted that the government provided no explanation as to why the legislature “shackle[d] the Commission with the mandatory rural-urban allocation
and the confinement of urban boundaries to municipal limits”.91 Unlike the
majority, which provided the legislature with a great deal of latitude to engage in electoral redistricting, the dissent held the legislature to account,
arguing that electoral redistricting was subject to constitutional requirements. Justice Cory argued that the “fundamental right to vote should not
be diminished without sound justification”.92 This approach is preferable
because it places constitutional limits on the political sphere. As the dissent
noted, legislative interference with the right to vote risked “bringing the
democratic process itself into disrepute”.93
2. The Continuing Debate: Haig, Harvey and Sauvé II
The majority and dissenting opinions in Saskatchewan Reference
provided two different approaches to the judicial supervision of the democratic process. One approach is to treat the electoral process as falling
88
David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and the Courts: Practices, Principles and
Problems” (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 224, at 228.
89
Carter, “Electoral Boundaries”, supra, note 87, at 58.
90
Saskatchewan Reference, supra, note 1, at 172, Cory J., dissenting.
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primarily within the political sphere, and to defer to the legislature. The
other approach is to treat the electoral process as falling partially within
the constitutional framework, and to hold the legislature to account for its
regulation of the democratic system. The Haig, Harvey and Sauvé II decisions likewise raise the politics/framework problem.
At issue in Haig v. Canada was whether section 3 guaranteed the right
to vote in the national referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.94 In all
provinces and territories except Quebec, the referendum took place under
federal legislation.95 In Quebec, the referendum took place under provincial
legislation that imposed a six-month residency requirement on all voters.96
Graham Haig, who had moved from Ontario to Quebec during the relevant
period, was ineligible to vote in Quebec because he did not meet the sixmonth residency requirement and he was also ineligible to vote in Ontario
because he no longer resided in an area covered by the federal legislation.97
In Haig, the five-member majority treated the referendum as falling
within the political domain and not the constitutional one. Writing for the
majority, L’Heureux-Dubé J. stated that a “referendum as a platform of
expression is ... a matter of legislative policy and not of constitutional
law”.98 As such, a referendum is not subject to section 2(b) or the Charter
in general because it is a “creation of legislation”.99 The majority also
concluded that section 3 was clearly limited to the election of representatives to the provincial and federal legislatures, and hence did not
guarantee the right to vote in a referendum.100
In a dissenting opinion, Iacobucci J. (joined by Lamer C.J.C.) argued
that Mr. Haig’s section 2(b) rights were violated by the effect of the
federal Referendum Act, and moreover, that the violation could not be
saved under section 1.101 Justice Iacobucci argued that the two referenda,
taken together, had a “national character” that was intended to involve all
Canadians.102 Although Iacobucci J. agreed with the view that the
government is not obligated to hold referenda, nor follow their results, he
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argued that if the government “chooses to conduct a referendum, it must
do so in compliance with the Charter”.103 Unlike the majority, Iacobucci J.
held that legislative creations such as referenda trigger constitutional
protections. His approach recognized the dual political-constitutional
character of the electoral process.
In its subsequent law of democracy case, Harvey v. New Brunswick
(Attorney General), the Court considered whether provisions of the
New Brunswick Elections Act violated section 3 of the Charter.104
Mr. Harvey, who was a member of the New Brunswick Legislative
Assembly, was convicted for violating the Act for having induced a female
under the age of 18 to vote in the election even though he knew she was
ineligible to vote.105 Under the terms of the Act, Mr. Harvey lost his seat
and he was also disqualified from running as a candidate for five years.106
He argued that section 3 provided an unqualified right to run for office, and
as such, the provisions of the Act infringed section 3.107 A six-member
majority of the Court, in an opinion written by La Forest J., agreed with the
appellant that the provisions of the Act violated section 3.108 The majority
found, however, that the provisions were justifiable under section 1.109
In dissent, McLachlin J. (as she was then) and L’Heureux-Dubé J. argued that the real issue in the case is “what power the courts have to
question a rule of the legislature as to the consequences of electoral corruption”.110 The dissent asserted that the legislature’s internal proceedings were
protected by parliamentary privilege, and hence, were not subject to the
Charter or to judicial review.111 While there is no doubt that corrupt electoral
practices must be addressed for the proper functioning of democracy,
claimed the dissent, it is the role of the legislature to respond to actions that
undermine its integrity.112 For the dissent, the rules regarding electoral cor-
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ruption fell squarely in the political sphere. The difficulty with this approach,
however, is that it does not provide enough protection to the citizens to be
free from electoral corruption. The majority’s approach is preferable because
it subjects the political sphere to constitutional limits but finds that the rights
violation is nonetheless justified.
The framework/politics problem was also evident in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé II).113 At issue in the case was
section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, which denied the right to vote to
prisoners who had sentences of two years or more.114 The Court was closely
divided. Writing for a five-member majority, McLachlin C.J.C. (joined by
Iacobucci, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.) struck the provision down as an
unjustified violation of section 3.115 The majority asserted that the “right to
vote is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be
lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, but careful examination.”116 According to the majority, judicial deference was not appropriate
when fundamental rights were at stake. In an important passage, McLachlin
C.J.C. made a distinction between fundamental rights, on the one hand, and
social and political policies, on the other:
The core democratic rights of Canadian do not fall within a “range of
acceptable alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose
at its discretion. Deference may be appropriate on a decision involving
competing social and political policies. It is not appropriate, however,
on a decision to limit fundamental rights.117

For the majority, the issue fell within the realm of the constitutional
framework since the right to vote was impaired. By contrast, the dissenting justices described the issue as involving “competing social or
political philosophies relating to the right to vote”.118 Writing for the dissenting justices, Gonthier J. (joined by L’Heureux-Dubé, Major and
Bastarache JJ.) argued that the “case rests on philosophical, political and
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social considerations which are not capable of “scientific proof”.119 For
this reason, the Court should defer to Parliament’s judgment that temporary disenfranchisement enhances rule of law and democracy.120 The
dissent’s “politics” approach, however, does not provide sufficient protection to the constitutional dimensions of the right to vote.
3. Debating Deference in Harper and Bryan
The Court’s more recent cases, Harper v. Canada and R. v. Bryan,
also exhibit the framework/politics problem. Both cases involved provisions of the Canada Elections Act that infringed the freedom of
expression. At issue in Harper was the constitutionality of third party
spending limits.121 Writing for a six-member majority, Bastarache J. held
that while the spending limits infringed the freedom of expression guarantee in section 2(b) of the Charter, the provisions were nonetheless
justifiable under section 1.122 In Bryan, a five-member majority upheld
the constitutionality of section 329 of the Canada Elections Act which
prohibited the transmission of election results between electoral ridings
before the closing of all polling stations in Canada.123 The claimant had
posted election results from Atlantic Canada on a website while polls
were still open in other electoral ridings.124 The majority held that although the provision infringed the freedom of expression as protected by
section 2(b), it could nonetheless be upheld under section 1.
The divide in the Court in the Harper and Bryan decisions is based
in large part on competing views about judicial deference to Parliament’s
regulation of the electoral process. I suggest that this debate over deference is rooted in a deeper question about the nature of the electoral
process. The Court majority was highly deferential to Parliament because
it saw the electoral process as being presumptively “political”. In
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Harper, the majority asserted that the workings of the electoral system
are a “political choice” and the specific details of these political choices
should be left to Parliament to determine.125 Since Parliament has the
right to “choose Canada’s electoral model”, it is incumbent on the Court
to defer to Parliament.126 Similarly in Bryan, the majority stated that the
Court ought to take a “natural attitude of deference” with respect to election laws.127 The majority of the Court viewed election laws as
presumptively falling within the political sphere.
In both cases, the majority was highly deferential in its treatment of
the social science evidence. In Harper, the majority stated that the Court
may rely on a “reasoned apprehension of harm” standard when the social
science evidence is either inconclusive or conflicting.128 Likewise in
Bryan, the majority was highly deferential in its assessment of the government’s social science evidence.129 The majority in each decision was
also highly deferential to the government in the section 1 analysis. In
Harper, the majority found that the government’s objective of electoral
fairness was pressing and substantial, and that the legislative provisions
satisfied the three stages of the proportionality test.130 Likewise in Bryan,
Bastarache J. found that the government’s objective of ensuring informational equality was pressing and substantial, and that the provision
satisfied the proportionality stage of the Oakes test.131
By contrast, the dissenting justices treated the problem before the Court
as one that fell within the realm of the constitutional framework. Because a
constitutional aspect of the electoral system (the right to freedom of
expression) was at issue in the case, there was no presumption of deference
to Parliament. For the dissenting justices, Parliament must reach a higher
standard of justification for violating the right of freedom of expression even
though it is doing so to achieve democratic aims. In their dissenting opinion
in Harper, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. (joined by Binnie J.) found that
the spending limits failed the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test
because they imposed a “virtual ban” on citizens who wished to participate
125
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in the political deliberation during the election period.132 According to the
dissent, the “dangers posited are wholly hypothetical” because there is no
evidence that wealthy citizens “are poised to hijack this country’s election
process”.133 Similarly in Bryan, Abella J. (joined by McLachlin C.J.C.,
Binnie and LeBel JJ.) argued that the provision did not meet the
proportionality test under section 1. The publication ban was an “excessive
response to an insufficiently proven harm”.134 Justice Abella also argued that
the evidence provided by the government was not sufficient to justify
infringing the freedom of expression.135
In summary, the majority opinions in both cases adopted a presumption of deference with respect to Parliament. This deference was based
on a prior determination that the electoral system fell within the political
realm. By contrast, the dissenting justices treated the problem before the
Court as one that belonged to the realm of the constitutional framework.
Because the constitutional aspects of the electoral system (the right to
freedom of expression) were at issue in the case, there should be no presumption of deference to Parliament.
4. Figueroa v. Canada and the Framework/Politics Problem
In the cases discussed above, the framework/politics problem is a recurring theme, but the Supreme Court did not devote much if any
discussion to it. The Figueroa decision is significant because a concurring opinion provides a discussion of the framework/politics problem
(without using this specific terminology). In Figueroa, the head of the
Communist Party of Canada challenged the constitutionality of a requirement that political parties nominate candidates in at least 50
electoral districts in order to register as a political party.136 Registered
political parties are granted a number of benefits under the Canada Elections Act.137 The Supreme Court held that the 50-candidate rule violated
section 3 and was not justifiable under section 1.138 Writing for the sixmember majority, Iacobucci J. stated that section 3 includes “the right of
132
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each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process”.139 The
majority also found that political parties act “as both a vehicle and outlet” for the participation of citizens in the electoral process.140
The dual political-constitutional character of the electoral process
was discussed by LeBel J. in a concurring opinion. Justice LeBel posited
that the “government has fairly wide latitude in choosing how to design
the electoral system and how to combine the various competing values at
play”.141 The choice among various representative options “should be
viewed as a matter of political and philosophical preference in which it is
not this Court’s role to intervene”.142 The role of the Court is to ensure
that the legislature stays within “constitutional limits”, and in particular,
to make sure that the values of effective representation and meaningful
participation are not compromised.143
Although the government has latitude to design the electoral system,
it infringed section 3 in this particular case because the regulations prevented the participation of citizens and political parties. Justice LeBel
argued that parties “enhance representation by making the political participation of individuals more effective than it would be if those
individuals acted alone without the coordination, structure and cooperation that the party system provides”.144 Parties also “keep voters
informed of important issues and provide them with meaningful electoral
choices”.145 For LeBel J., the regulation of political parties raises
“framework” issues. He stated that parties are “such important actors in
our political system that, although they are private and voluntary organizations, they also possess some of the characteristics of a public
institution”.146 The number of candidates a party must field “is part of the
framework for the recognition and regulation of political parties”.147 One
way of understanding Lebel J.’s and the majority’s position is that
the regulatory framework essentially shut out or disenfranchised smaller
139
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political parties.148 For this reason, the Court majority was not willing to
defer to the legislature. The Court majority’s decision in Sauvé II is similar: rules that disenfranchise citizens immediately raise serious
framework problems that override judicial deference to the political
sphere.149
5. Democratic Legitimacy and Navigating the Duality of the
Electoral System
Justice LeBel’s approach in the Figueroa case provides a helpful
guide to navigating the framework/politics problem. Although LeBel J.’s
opinion was a concurrence, and hence of limited precedential value, I
suggest that it provides a useful analysis of the duality of the electoral
system. As a start, LeBel J. acknowledges the dual political-constitutional
nature of the electoral process. He noted that the government has “fairly
wide latitude” in the task of designing the electoral system and choosing
which values are emphasized.150 The choice among these options is a
matter of political and philosophical preference, and as such, the Court
should not intervene in the decision to choose one electoral option over
another.151 The Court does, however, have a role in ensuring that the legislature does not exceed certain constitutional limits.152 Although LeBel J.
does not provide much detail on what precisely these constitutional limits
may be, he states that the Court’s role is to ensure that certain values,
such as effective representation and meaningful participation, are protected.153 In the context of Figueroa, LeBel J. found that the
government’s regulation of political parties violated the section 3 right to
vote. The regulation of political parties undoubtedly falls within the
realm of the political because it involves the basic design of the electoral
process, but it is nonetheless subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Thus, according to LeBel J., the legislature’s role is to choose “between the various species of democratic electoral system” while the
Court’s role is to subject these choices to “certain boundaries, which it is
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the responsibility of the judiciary to delineate”.154 Justice LeBel’s formulation is helpful because it holds that both the legislature and the courts
have a role to play in the regulation of the democratic system. Although
Parliament has the power to make choices about the electoral system in
the political sphere, these choices are subjected to constitutional limits by
the courts. Crucially, it is for the courts to “delineate” the constitutional
boundaries of the legislature’s political choices.
Another reason the Court should treat electoral laws with a certain
amount of skepticism is that elected officials have a propensity to enact
laws that perpetuate their own power. The Canadian law of democracy
literature has examined the structural problem of partisan self-dealing in
detail.155 The risk posed by partisan self-dealing cannot be adequately
addressed by a Court that is overly deferential to Parliament.156 As I have
argued elsewhere, the Court should not automatically defer to Parliament
in its law of democracy cases on the basis that the government has the
power to choose the electoral system.157 The Court’s principal role is to
ensure the fairness of the democratic process.158 To do so, the Court must
recognize the duality of the electoral system, and ensure that the political
aspect falls within constitutional limits.
The proper characterization of the electoral system as either political
or constitutional (or both) is also implicitly connected to the issue of judicial legitimacy. If the electoral process is deemed to be a purely
political entity, then judicial oversight is illegitimate because the court is
intervening in the political sphere. If, however, the electoral process is
viewed as being both political and constitutional, then judicial intervention is legitimate. Thus, perceptions about the appropriate judicial role is
affected by a prior position on the nature of the democratic process as
either political or constitutional.
In the Opitz case, for example, the justices were divided with respect
to the Court’s role in adjudicating contested elections. The majority justices favoured an approach that leaves the political system to politics,
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the “motive behind the legislation may itself be illegitimate”. Id.
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subject to certain very broad parameters. By adopting the substantive
approach, the majority signalled that mistakes in the administrative procedures are not necessarily fatal. The majority’s decision also makes it
less likely that candidates will challenge election outcomes in court. By
choosing a more difficult standard to meet, the Court was insulating the
electoral system from judicial review. By contrast, the dissenting justices
favoured an approach that holds the government to account for its administration of the electoral process. By taking a more formal approach
to the requirements for entitlement to vote, the dissent provided greater
opportunities for candidates to challenge the finality and accuracy of
election outcomes in court.
The Court’s decision in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)159 provides another illustration of LeBel J.’s approach. In Libman, the Court
considered the constitutionality of the third party spending limits set out
in Quebec’s Referendum Act, which laid forth the rules for the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.160 The referendum legislation
required that regulated expenses be incurred only through a national
committee, which meant that individuals who supported neither the “yes”
nor the “no” option were limited to unregulated expenses.161 The Court
held that the restrictions infringed the freedom of political expression and
could not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter.162 It found that the
provisions did not meet the minimal impairment test because the limits
imposed on groups that do not affiliate themselves with the national
committees are so restrictive that they amount to a total ban.163
At the same time, the Court stated that it was important to prevent
“the most affluent members of society from exerting a disproportionate
influence by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater
resources”.164 As noted by Colin Feasby, the Court appeared to favour an
“egalitarian” approach to the rules governing spending during a referendum or an election.165 The basic idea is that those with greater wealth
should not be permitted to control the electoral process and thereby dis159
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advantage those with less wealth; that is, disparities in private wealth
should not be translated into disparities of political influence. The Court
recognized that Parliament has the right to regulate campaign spending
and to choose the values underlying election laws, but it also held that
the specific spending limits at issue in the case unjustifiably infringed the
freedom of expression.
In its recent cases, however, most notably in Harper and Bryan, the
Court majority has deferred to the legislature on the basis that the electoral system is “political” and hence not a subject about which the Court
should be overly involved. The difficulty with this approach is that it
does not pay sufficient attention to the duality of the electoral process.
Although there is an important political aspect to the electoral process,
there is an equally important constitutional aspect. As noted by LeBel J.,
it is the role of the Court to subject the political aspect to constitutional
limits. Instead of automatically deferring to the government on the basis
that the electoral system is “political”, the Court should instead subject
the legislative provision to greater scrutiny.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the phenomenon of “dissenting about democracy”. Although the Supreme Court’s law of democracy cases
involve a wide array of topics, I claim that many of the disputes between
the majority and dissenting justices are based upon fundamentally divergent views on the nature of the electoral system itself. The puzzle
underlying many cases is whether the electoral system falls within the
realm of the constitutional framework or the realm of politics. I have referred to this puzzle as the “framework/politics” problem.
Unless the Court devotes greater consideration to this issue, there is
every reason to believe that the framework/politics problem will continue
to present challenges in future cases. It is very difficult, if not impossible,
to characterize the electoral system as either political or constitutional.
The challenge posed by the framework/politics problem is that the electoral system is both a constitutional and political entity at any given
point. I have argued that the best approach to the framework/politics
problem is to recognize the dual political-constitutional character of
the electoral process. As LeBel J. argued in Figueroa, it is for the legislature to choose among different types of electoral structures, and for
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the Court to subject these choices to “certain boundaries, which it is the
responsibility of the judiciary to delineate”.166 In recent cases, however,
the majority’s position has been to reflexively defer to Parliament’s electoral rules on the basis that the electoral system is political. The Court
should instead recognize the dual constitutional-political nature of the
electoral system. In particular, this recognition would mean that the Court
would not automatically defer to Parliament.
The framework/politics problem also raises larger questions about
democratic legitimacy and the role of the Court. One view is that judicial
intervention in the electoral system detracts from democratic legitimacy
because the Court is encroaching on the political sphere. Another view is
that judicial intervention in the electoral system enhances democratic
legitimacy because the electoral process is bound by constitutional rules.
I have argued that democratic legitimacy is enhanced when the Court
ensures that the electoral process meets constitutional requirements.
A posture of automatic deference to Parliament on the basis that the electoral process is “political” diminishes democratic legitimacy because it
does not hold elected officials to account for their actions. In sum, the
dual constitutional-political nature of the democratic process requires
active involvement by both legislatures and courts.
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